A six-digit code from an authenticator app is multi-factor authentication. So is a push prompt with number matching. Neither one is phishing-resistant MFA under federal policy, and the difference decides which methods an agency has to switch off. Two documents set the bar: OMB Memorandum M-22-09, issued January 26, 2022, which made phishing-resistant MFA mandatory for agency staff, contractors and partners, and NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63B-4, published July 2025, which defines what earns the label and now covers synced passkeys.
What counts as phishing-resistant MFA?
An authenticator is phishing-resistant when the protocol itself stops secrets and authenticator outputs from reaching an impostor site, without depending on the user to spot the fake. NIST SP 800-63B-4 Section 3.2.5 defines it that way and recognizes two methods: channel binding and verifier name binding.
The definition rules out more than people expect. Section 3.2.5 says authenticators "that involve the manual entry of an authenticator output (e.g., out-of-band and OTP authenticators) SHALL NOT be considered phishing-resistant," because a fake site can pass whatever the user types straight to the real one. It also says phishing resistance "requires single- or multi-factor cryptographic authentication." M-22-09 uses a similar test: authentication "designed to detect and prevent disclosure of authentication secrets and outputs to a website or application masquerading as a legitimate system."
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and Common Access Card (CAC) credentials meet it through channel binding, because they authenticate with client-authenticated TLS tied to that specific connection. WebAuthn, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standard behind FIDO2 security keys and passkeys, meets it through verifier name binding: the key is tied to the site's domain, so a look-alike domain gets nothing it can reuse. NIST calls channel binding the more secure of the two and says both satisfy the requirement.
What does OMB M-22-09 require?
M-22-09 makes phishing-resistant MFA mandatory for agency staff, contractors and partners, and says that for public users it "must be an option" on public-facing systems that support MFA. The memo set its zero trust goals for the end of fiscal year 2024, and OMB's August 31, 2026 memo M-26-18 still lists M-22-09 among the policies agencies should follow when managing digital identity.
The identity section is specific about what has to change:
- MFA must be enforced at the application layer, instead of the network layer.
- Password policies must not require special characters or regular rotation.
- For routine self-service access by staff, contractors and partners, agency systems "must discontinue support for authentication methods that fail to resist phishing, including protocols that register phone numbers for SMS or voice calls, supply one-time codes, or receive push notifications."
- When authorizing access, agencies must consider at least one device-level signal alongside identity information.
The memo describes "partners" as users outside the agency whose use of agency systems requires strong MFA, offers "Government contractors submitting financial information" as an example, and leaves each agency to set the scope for its own systems. NIST SP 800-63B-4 Section 2.2.2 repeats the core rule: federal agencies "SHALL require their staff, contractors, and partners to use phishing-resistant authentication to access federal information systems."
On credentials, M-22-09 says PIV, including Derived PIV, will be the simplest route for many systems, and notes that OMB M-19-17 makes PIV the "primary" means of authentication. Where PIV isn't practical, agencies may use FIDO2 and WebAuthn authenticators, managed centrally and connected to enterprise identities.
Which authenticators qualify?
The table applies SP 800-63B-4 Section 3.2.5 to the authenticators agencies most often weigh, with the M-22-09 position alongside.
| Authenticator | Phishing-resistant? | Basis in SP 800-63B-4 | Federal notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIV or CAC card | Yes | Channel binding through client-authenticated TLS (3.2.5.1) | M-19-17 makes PIV the primary credential |
| FIDO2 security key or device-bound passkey | Yes | Verifier name binding through WebAuthn (3.2.5.2) | Key is not exportable, so AAL3 is possible if the other AAL3 requirements are met |
| Synced passkey | Yes, when properly configured | WebAuthn domain binding (Appendix B.5) | AAL2 only, with extra federal enterprise conditions |
| Authenticator app code (OTP) | No | Manual entry lets a fake site relay the code (3.2.5) | M-22-09 lists one-time codes for discontinuation |
| SMS or voice code | No | Manual entry over the phone network (3.2.5) | M-22-09 lists SMS and voice for discontinuation |
| Push approval, with or without number matching | No | Out-of-band, not cryptographic authentication bound to the session (3.2.5) | M-22-09 lists push notifications for discontinuation |
At AAL2, SP 800-63B-4 says verifiers "SHALL offer at least one phishing-resistant authentication option." At AAL3, phishing resistance is required.
Can agencies use synced passkeys?
Yes, up to AAL2, under conditions in Appendix B of SP 800-63B-4, which NIST marks as normative. Syncing means the private key can be exported to a cloud sync fabric, which violates AAL3's non-exportability requirement, so synced passkeys "SHALL NOT be used at AAL3."
Appendix B.2 first sets rules for any sync fabric: keys stored only in encrypted form, access to the fabric protected by "AAL2-equivalent MFA," and the agency's requirements "documented and communicated, including on public-facing websites" where applicable. For federal enterprise use, meaning staff, contractors and mission partners in scope for PIV guidance, it adds three requirements and one recommendation. The keys must sit in a sync fabric with Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) moderate protections or equivalent. The devices that create and sync them must be under mobile device management or similar controls that block syncing or sharing to unauthorized devices or fabrics. Access to the sync fabric must run through agency-managed accounts. And authenticators should support attestation, such as enterprise attestation. As written, those conditions point to managed devices and agency-controlled accounts, not a passkey a user syncs through a personal account.
Appendix B.3, written against the WebAuthn Level 3 flags, matters for the engineers configuring the relying party. Verifiers "SHALL indicate that UV is preferred" and must inspect the User Verified flag in each response; if it isn't set, the agency has to treat the passkey as a single-factor authenticator. Verifiers may use the Backup Eligible and Backup State flags to restrict synced keys, but a Backup Eligible key has not necessarily been synced, and NIST says agencies "SHOULD NOT condition acceptance" on Backup State for public-facing applications.
Where phishing-resistant MFA rollouts stall
The fallbacks, mostly. Adding PIV or FIDO2 is the visible half of the work. The requirement in M-22-09 is to stop supporting the weaker methods for routine staff access, and a system that still accepts a texted code when the key is missing hasn't changed much for an attacker.
Account recovery is the next gap. M-22-09 expects agencies to keep emergency and recovery procedures, warns that they "represent a potential bypass of standard authentication protocols," and says recovery should require "high-friction methods that are costly for an adversary to overcome, such as in-person verification, live video interaction, or other similar methods." If a user who loses a key can get back in with a help desk call and an emailed code, that call is the path to protect.
Network-layer MFA is a third. A VPN prompt in front of applications that don't authenticate the user themselves doesn't meet the application-layer requirement. Those applications usually need to move behind the agency's central identity provider, which M-22-09 also requires. Non-web paths need the same attention: WebAuthn is a browser standard, and M-22-09 says enterprise identity systems should also support human authentication "through non-graphical user interfaces, such as scripts and command line tools," so administrator consoles, remote sessions and thick clients belong in the plan.
Users without a PIV card are the last. New contractors waiting on credentials, partners and mobile-only users are where FIDO2 keys and Derived PIV fill in, and where loose temporary exceptions tend to become permanent.
M-22-09 organizes its zero trust goals using CISA's maturity model; our guide to the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model shows where its actions land on the model's stages.
How to plan the rollout
A workable sequence:
- List every application and every way a user can authenticate to it, including fallbacks, service desk resets and self-service recovery.
- Decide which populations get PIV or Derived PIV and which get FIDO2 authenticators, and register the non-PIV authenticators in the enterprise identity system so they are managed centrally.
- If synced passkeys are allowed, document the Appendix B requirements and set the relying party to prefer and check user verification.
- Turn off SMS, voice, one-time codes and push for routine staff access, application by application, once users hold a phishing-resistant authenticator.
- Rebuild recovery so it does not fall back to the methods you just turned off, and keep emergency exceptions documented and time-limited.
- For public-facing services, start from M-26-18 (August 31, 2026). As required by law, it says agencies must offer Login.gov as a sign-on option for in-scope public-facing websites, and it gives agencies 240 days to run a NIST SP 800-63-4 Digital Identity Risk Management process for public-facing services that have authentication.
Each step is a change to how a system authenticates users, so expect the agency's security team and authorizing official to review it, and plan the schedule the way you would any change that touches an ATO. Our cybersecurity practice covers Zero Trust aligned to NIST SP 800-207. The PIV certificates involved also figure in the federal post-quantum migration, since they rely on public-key cryptography.
The Bottom Line
In practice, phishing-resistant MFA for federal staff means PIV, CAC or WebAuthn authenticators with user verification, and M-22-09 also requires turning off SMS, voice, one-time codes and push for routine staff access. Start with an inventory of every way a user can sign in or recover an account, including command-line and other non-web paths, and close the weaker ones as users get a phishing-resistant authenticator.
FAQ
Is push MFA with number matching phishing-resistant?
Not under the federal definition. NIST SP 800-63B-4 requires cryptographic authentication bound to the session for phishing resistance and says out-of-band and OTP authenticators that involve manual entry do not qualify. M-22-09 lists methods that "receive push notifications" among those agencies must stop supporting for routine staff access.
Do federal contractors need phishing-resistant MFA?
M-22-09 requires it for agency staff, contractors and partners who access agency-hosted accounts, and NIST SP 800-63B-4 Section 2.2.2 says agencies "SHALL require their staff, contractors, and partners" to use it to access federal information systems. Requirements for a contractor's own systems come from the contract, and the contracting officer decides how they apply.
Are passkeys phishing-resistant?
Passkeys use WebAuthn, which binds the key to the site's domain, so NIST treats properly configured ones as phishing-resistant. Device-bound passkeys and FIDO2 security keys keep the private key on the device. Synced passkeys export the key to a sync fabric, so SP 800-63B-4 allows them up to AAL2 and not at AAL3.
Does an agency have to use PIV for phishing-resistant MFA?
M-22-09 says PIV, including Derived PIV, will be the simplest way to meet the requirement for many systems and notes that OMB M-19-17 makes PIV the primary means of authentication. Where PIV is not practical, it permits FIDO2 and WebAuthn authenticators, centrally managed and connected to enterprise identities.
Sources
- OMB, M-22-09: Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles (January 26, 2022)
- NIST, SP 800-63B-4: Digital Identity Guidelines, Authentication and Authenticator Management (July 2025)
- OMB, M-26-18: Scaling Use of Login.gov to Deliver a Universal Sign-on for Public Services (August 31, 2026)
- W3C, Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 3
How we researched this. Every number, date and requirement here is checked against the sources listed above, primary documents first, and the post is fact-checked again before publication. When a rule, date or status changes, we update the post and log the change below. Read our editorial standards or send a correction.





