CybersecurityIn the news

NIST IR 8547 Is Final: The 2030 and 2035 Dates, and the Earlier Ones Federal Systems Face

Yahia Aboushadi
Director of Brand and Marketing, Pyramid Systems
Reading time:
6 min.
Updated 02 November 2026

On October 27, 2026, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the final NIST IR 8547, "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards," replacing the draft released in November 2024. It sets two dates for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035. For most federal systems, though, other documents set earlier dates, and the report says so itself.

What does the final NIST IR 8547 set?

It sets one schedule for every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm in NIST's standards: "Deprecated after 2030" and "Disallowed after 2035." That covers RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures under FIPS 186, and the finite field and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV schemes under SP 800-56A and RSA under SP 800-56B for key establishment.

The replacements are the 2024 standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for signatures, plus the stateful LMS and XMSS schemes in SP 800-208. NIST says HQC will become a second approved key-establishment scheme once its FIPS is published, and a signature standard derived from FALCON is in development.

What changed from the 2024 draft?

The biggest change is scope. The draft deprecated only keys at 112 bits of security strength after 2030; 128-bit and stronger keys stayed acceptable until they were disallowed after 2035. The final report deprecates all of them after 2030.

Item November 2024 draft October 2026 final
RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures, 128 bits or more Disallowed after 2035, no deprecation step Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
Diffie-Hellman, MQV and RSA key establishment, 128 bits or more Disallowed after 2035, no deprecation step Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
Federal deadlines NSM-10 goal of 2035 2035 goal kept; EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15 dates stated, and the earlier ones govern
Alternative to ML-KEM "One or more alternatives" expected HQC selected; FIPS in development
Default ML-KEM parameter set Not named ML-KEM-768
TLS and PIV Cited as standards to be revised, with no dates TLS called "an early priority," with the TLS 1.3 deadline; PIV updates must "begin early"

The final also adds that, as EO 14412 directs, NIST is revising Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) processes to speed validation of modules that implement post-quantum algorithms.

Which earlier dates still apply to federal systems?

The report's 2030 to 2035 window "does not alter the earlier deadlines" set by EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15. Under those, high value assets (HVAs) and high impact systems must adopt post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030 and post-quantum digital signatures by December 31, 2031.

A high impact system is one where at least one FIPS 199 security objective is rated "high." The report puts other systems with highly sensitive data, or data "expected to remain mission-sensitive in 2030," in the same priority group, following M-26-15. NIST describes 2030 to 2035 as room for "lower-risk systems and applications with legacy constraints."

Lower-risk does not mean nothing is due until 2035. Agencies must support TLS 1.3 no later than January 2, 2030, a requirement the report attributes to EO 14306 and M-26-15. M-26-15 sets the objective of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030 across agency systems. And the report says application-specific guidance, such as the next revision of SP 800-52 for TLS, "may require or recommend migration to quantum-resistant key-establishment schemes before the classical schemes are generally disallowed." Vendors should also watch the FAR rule that EO 14412 directs; we laid out that and the other order and memo dates in federal post-quantum cryptography deadlines, date by date.

The report also tells agencies to identify systems that cannot support post-quantum cryptography and prioritize them "for replacement or decommissioning."

What "deprecated" means in practice

Deprecated is not a ban. The report uses the SP 800-131A definition: the algorithm "may be used, but there is some security risk," and "the data owner must examine this risk potential and decide whether to continue to use a deprecated algorithm or key length." Disallowed means it "is no longer allowed for the stated purpose." Legacy use covers processing information that is already protected, such as verifying an old signature or decrypting archived data.

The order of the work follows from the threat. Encrypted data can be collected now and decrypted later, so key establishment comes first. The report says authentication stays secure as long as the algorithm is secure "when the authentication is performed," which is why signatures get the later date.

In our view, a system still running RSA or elliptic curve key exchange after 2030 is carrying a known risk someone should own on paper. Many agencies will record that in the risk register or track it as a plan of action and milestones item, and the authorizing official and agency policy decide how it is accepted. Our post on how long an ATO takes covers how those reviews are scheduled.

Hybrid, TLS and PIV

NIST will accommodate hybrid key establishment and dual signatures in FIPS 140 validation. A composite key-establishment scheme can be validated as long as at least one input comes from an approved scheme, "even if other inputs are disallowed." The report also cautions that hybrids "add complexity" and are expected to be temporary, leading to a second move to post-quantum only.

TLS is called "an early priority" because it "protects data in transit for nearly every federal system," and TLS 1.3 offers a near-term path to hybrid key exchange with ML-KEM. Personal Identity Verification (PIV) is named as critical trust infrastructure: cards, readers, middleware and the issuing PKI all need updates, and because they follow multi-year replacement cycles, the report says that work "must begin early."

Symmetric cryptography mostly stays. NIST does not expect to move away from its symmetric standards, such as AES and the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, though a few 112-bit symmetric standards will be disallowed in 2030.

What to check first

Tag each system in the cryptographic inventory as an HVA, high impact, other priority, or lower risk, so the 2030 and 2031 dates land on the right systems. For every system, check TLS 1.3 status against January 2, 2030, and watch for the SP 800-52 revision. Ask each product vendor in writing for ML-KEM support, the parameter sets offered, hybrid modes and CMVP validation status, and record who owns any deprecated algorithm still in use after 2030. Our cybersecurity services page covers our NIST compliance work.

IR 8547 is a planning document, and NIST says it will revise SP 800-131A with more detailed schedules. Which dates bind a specific system or contract is set by the contract, the agency's policy and its authorizing official.

The Bottom Line

IR 8547 gives every system an outer date, 2035, and a point after which keeping RSA or elliptic curve cryptography is a documented risk decision, 2030. For most federal teams the binding dates come earlier, from EO 14412, EO 14306 and M-26-15, so sort systems by category, check TLS 1.3 status, and ask vendors for their ML-KEM support in writing.

FAQ

When is RSA deprecated under NIST IR 8547?

Table 2 of the final report lists RSA signatures at 112 bits of classical security strength or more as "Deprecated after 2030" and "Disallowed after 2035." Table 4 gives RSA key establishment under SP 800-56B the same dates. ECDSA, EdDSA and the Diffie-Hellman and MQV schemes follow the same schedule.

What changed between the NIST IR 8547 draft and the final version?

The November 2024 draft deprecated only 112-bit keys after 2030 and left 128-bit and stronger keys acceptable until they were disallowed after 2035. The final version deprecates all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030. It also ties the schedule to EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15, names ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set, names HQC as the alternative to ML-KEM and adds guidance on TLS and PIV.

Can we keep using RSA after 2030 on a federal system?

NIST's standards allow deprecated algorithms with some security risk, and the data owner decides whether to continue. For high value assets, high impact systems and other prioritized systems, the report says that use is constrained by the earlier EO 14412 dates of December 31, 2030 for key establishment and December 31, 2031 for signatures. Your authorizing official and agency policy decide how any remaining risk is accepted.

Does AES-128 need to be replaced for post-quantum?

No. The report says NIST does not expect to transition away from its symmetric standards, and that approved symmetric primitives with at least 128 bits of classical security are believed to meet at least Category 1. It does say a few 112-bit symmetric standards will be disallowed in 2030, under SP 800-131A.

Sources

  1. NIST, NIST IR 8547 Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026)
  2. NIST CSRC, NIST IR 8547 publication page and document history
  3. NIST, NIST IR 8547 initial public draft (November 2024)
  4. OMB, M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (June 24, 2026)
  5. NIST, NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (October 27, 2026)
  6. Nextgov/FCW, NIST issues roadmap for transition to post-quantum encryption standards (October 27, 2026)

How we researched this. Every number, date and requirement here is checked against the sources listed above, primary documents first, and the post is fact-checked again before publication. When a rule, date or status changes, we update the post and log the change below. Read our editorial standards or send a correction.

Update history.

  • : Replaced the featured photo, which repeated the one on another post. The text did not change.
Yahia Aboushadi
About the author. Yahia Aboushadi is Director of Brand and Marketing at Pyramid Systems, an employee-owned federal IT firm in Fairfax, Virginia, that has delivered for federal agencies since 1995. . Connect on LinkedIn.

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