A system can hold a valid Authorization to Operate (ATO) and still be a long way from a continuous ATO (cATO). DoD treats cATO as a state a system moves into after it is authorized, not a shortcut to authorization, and its evaluation criteria spell out what the reviewers look for. Civilian agencies reach the same goal under a different name, with different documents and a different approver.
What is a continuous ATO?
A continuous ATO is a DoD authorization in which a system keeps operating without a fixed reauthorization date, because its risk is watched and defended in near real time instead of reassessed every few years. The idea comes from a February 2022 memo signed by the DoD Senior Information Security Officer, which says DoD CISO approved cATOs "do not have an expiration date and will remain in effect as long as the required real time risk posture is maintained."
The authorizing official (AO) stops relying on a package assembled once and starts relying on evidence that is produced every day. If that evidence stops, so does the case for the cATO.
What are the three cATO competencies?
The 2022 memo says the authorizing official must demonstrate three competencies: ongoing visibility of key cybersecurity activities inside the system boundary, the ability to conduct active cyber defense to respond to threats in real time, and adoption of an approved DevSecOps reference design.
DoD's evaluation criteria restate them as "Continuous Monitoring (CONMON), Active Cyber Defense (ACD) and Secure Software Supply Chain (SSSC)." That third name matters. It moves the question from "do you use DevSecOps tools" to "can you show where every piece of software came from and how it was built." The criteria then evaluate the secure supply chain in three parts, under the headings "Authorize the DevSecOps Platform," "Authorize the Process" and "Authorize the People."
What do the cATO evaluation criteria require?
The first requirement settles what cATO is not: "In order to receive an approved cATO, the organization must have a current ATO with no 'High' or 'Very High' findings." A team with open high findings is working on its ATO, not its cATO.
After that, the evidence is concrete. The document lists what it expects a package to contain, and reading it as a checklist is the fastest way to see the gap:
- The system authorization package: System Security Plan (SSP), Security Assessment Plan (SAP), Risk Assessment Report (RAR), the signed ATO memo and Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms), kept current through the continuous monitoring process.
- A system continuous monitoring strategy and a cATO risk management strategy, with monitoring timelines (the criteria give examples from "automated every hour, minute, second" to "manual once a year").
- A system authorization boundary diagram, an incident response plan and a continuity of operations or disaster recovery plan.
- Active cyber defense evidence, including a service level agreement with a certified Cybersecurity Service Provider (CSSP).
- A penetration test of the development and operational environments by a qualified third party, "within 90 days and annually thereafter." The criteria don't say what starts the 90-day clock, so settle that with the reviewers.
- A software bill of materials (SBOM) for the DevSecOps platform, with a statement of how it was developed.
- Team evidence, including periodic tabletop exercises with after action reports.
The document marks which items must be delivered, so check the current version before treating any one of them as optional. Our post on SBOMs and the secure software attestation form covers the civilian software supply chain rules that sit alongside this.
Who approves a cATO, and can it be taken away?
Under the evaluation criteria, "cATO approval authority resides with the DoD CISO." The AO works with the component chief information security officer, who presents the system, and the package goes to the DoD CIO's cybersecurity office for review. A cATO approval memo template is part of the submission.
The criteria also describe the way back. Risk tolerances are set in the cATO risk management strategy, and when an issue falls outside the agreed thresholds, the CSSP or the Security Control Assessor (SCA) "may initiate a review of the cATO. If so, the CISO may decide to revoke the cATO." With the previous authorizing official's approval, the system can revert to its original ATO.
The memo lists reasons a cATO can be revoked, including "poor cybersecurity posture as identified through continuous monitoring or external assessments" and "changes in risk tolerance." It also says "The cATO determination does not affect the underlying system ATO." That is why the underlying ATO package can't be allowed to go stale just because the system is on a cATO.
How do civilian agencies do it?
Civilian agencies don't use the cATO memo; they use ongoing authorization under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 and NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2. The idea is the same, a move from a point-in-time decision to continuous risk review, but the conditions and approvals come from different documents.
A-130 Appendix I sets two conditions. "First, the information system or common controls must have been granted an initial authorization to operate by the designated authorizing official." Second, information security and privacy continuous monitoring programs must cover all implemented controls at the appropriate rigor and frequency. Until the AO formally approves the transition, systems "remain under a static authorization process with specific authorization termination dates enforced by the agency."
NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 puts the work in Task M-6, Ongoing Authorization: "Review the security and privacy posture of the system on an ongoing basis to determine whether the risk remains acceptable." Its Appendix F adds that "reauthorizations are unnecessary in situations where the continuous monitoring program provides authorizing officials with the information necessary to manage the risk." Many articles still cite NIST's 2014 white paper on ongoing authorization. NIST withdrew it on April 19, 2019 and points readers to SP 800-37 Rev. 2.
| DoD continuous ATO | Civilian ongoing authorization | |
|---|---|---|
| Governing documents | DoD cATO memo (2022) and evaluation criteria | OMB Circular A-130, NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 |
| Entry condition | Current ATO with no High or Very High findings | Initial ATO plus continuous monitoring programs in place |
| What is evaluated | Continuous monitoring, active cyber defense, secure software supply chain | Continuous monitoring of all implemented controls |
| Who decides | DoD CISO, on the component CISO's presentation | The system's authorizing official |
| Review rhythm | Continuous; revocable after a triggered review | Frequency set by the organization (control CA-6) |
Where does DoD's newer guidance fit?
On September 24, 2025, the Department of War (DoD) announced the Cybersecurity Risk Management Construct (CSRMC), a five-phase lifecycle (Design, Build, Test, Onboard and Operations). Among its ten tenets is "Continuous Monitoring and ATO," described as "enabling real-time situational awareness to achieve constant ATO posture," and it says the previous Risk Management Framework "was overly reliant on static checklists and manual processes."
The announcement doesn't mention cATO by name or withdraw the 2022 memo, and it doesn't publish new evaluation criteria. For now, the cATO evaluation criteria remain the most specific public description of what DoD reviewers expect. Confirm with your component's cybersecurity office which guidance applies before building a schedule around it.
How to tell if a system is ready to ask
Start with the ATO you have. If it carries open High or Very High findings, close them first, because the criteria won't consider a cATO until they're gone. Then take the evaluation criteria and mark each item as "produced automatically," "produced by hand" or "missing." Items produced by hand are the real gap, because a cATO assumes the evidence keeps coming without someone assembling it.
Two items tend to take longest. The third-party penetration test needs a scheduled window across both development and operational environments. The SBOM for the DevSecOps platform needs a repeatable way to generate it, not a one-time export. Our earlier piece on accelerating federal ATO with DevSecOps covers the pipeline side, and how long an ATO takes covers the initial authorization a cATO depends on.
Before the first cATO conversation, write the thresholds into the cATO risk management strategy and agree them with the AO, the CSSP and the SCA. It helps to name concrete examples of what would cross them, such as a new external interface, a critical finding past its due date or a change to the boundary, so no one argues later about whether a change counts.
Civilian teams can use the same inventory, then ask the AO two questions: what review frequency they want under control CA-6, and what evidence they will accept in place of a reauthorization package. Our DevSecOps team builds the pipelines and monitoring that produce that evidence.
The Bottom Line
A continuous ATO is earned by a system that already has a clean ATO and can show, with live evidence, that its monitoring, defense and software supply chain work every day. Read the DoD evaluation criteria line by line against your current package before asking, and on the civilian side, agree the review frequency and triggers with the authorizing official first. Whether a system qualifies is the authorizing official's and the approving CISO's call.
FAQ
What does cATO stand for?
DoD uses cATO for continuous authorization to operate; its evaluation criteria document says "Continuous Authority to Operate." Either way, it describes a system that operates without a fixed reauthorization date because its security posture is monitored and defended continuously, and the approval can be withdrawn if that posture is not maintained.
Does a cATO expire?
No. The February 2022 DoD memo says DoD CISO approved cATOs "do not have an expiration date and will remain in effect as long as the required real time risk posture is maintained." It can be revoked, for example for poor cybersecurity posture or changes in risk tolerance, and the memo says a system can lose its cATO "without any loss of existing ATO."
Can a civilian agency grant a cATO?
The cATO memo and evaluation criteria are DoD documents. Civilian agencies follow OMB Circular A-130 and NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, which describe ongoing authorization: after an initial ATO, and once continuous monitoring is in place, the authorizing official can formally move the system off a fixed termination date. What an agency calls it and how it documents the decision is set by agency policy.
Is cATO the same as FedRAMP continuous monitoring?
No. FedRAMP certifies cloud services for government-wide use, and its rules include ongoing reporting by the provider. A cATO or ongoing authorization is the system owner's own authorization decision. An agency system built on a FedRAMP certified service can inherit controls from it, but the agency still makes its own decision.
Does CSRMC replace cATO?
DoD's announcement of the Cybersecurity Risk Management Construct on September 24, 2025 lists "Continuous Monitoring and ATO" as one of ten tenets, aimed at a "constant ATO posture," but it does not mention cATO or say the 2022 memo is withdrawn. Check your component's current guidance before planning around either.
Sources
- DoD, Continuous Authorization to Operate (cATO) memo (February 2022)
- DoD CIO, DevSecOps Continuous Authority to Operate Evaluation Criteria
- DoD CIO, Department of War Announces New Cybersecurity Risk Management Construct (September 24, 2025)
- OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource (July 2016)
- NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations (December 2018)
- NIST CSWP 3, Supplemental Guidance on Ongoing Authorization (June 2014, withdrawn April 19, 2019)
How we researched this. Every number, date and requirement here is checked against the sources listed above, primary documents first, and the post is fact-checked again before publication. When a rule, date or status changes, we update the post and log the change below. Read our editorial standards or send a correction.





